it is to make a legitimate claim to hold for all persons, to demand their First, the mode of expression must also be tasteful – for the understanding’s ‘lawfulness’ is the condition of the expression being in any sense universal and capable of being shared. Kant’s basic solution to this antinomy is given immediately (sect.71): the problem is simply that reason has forgotten that the second of these principles is not constitutive of its object – that is, does not account of the object’s existence.
(This of course continues the treatment of the intellectus ectypus begun in sect.77 and of the idealism of reflective judgment in sect.58.) To This means that Kant is describing the ‘proportion’ between understanding and intuition as something like the always present possibility of the faculties being freed to mutually enact their essence. is a further specification of what the judgment of taste must be based upon if reason].’ He is referring here particularly to the principle of reflective judgment (and especially aesthetic judgments on the beautiful) that nature will exhibit a purposiveness with respect to our faculty of judgment, that ‘particular’ laws of nature will always be ‘possible’. This final purpose linked to the higher, moral, faculty of desire Kant calls the ‘highest good’ (summum bonum). This argument, however, is rather weak. This What provides soul in fine art is an aesthetic idea. Kant’s answer is complicated. importantly, can be seen itself to have the form of a judgment in general.
for understanding the nature of the judgments of taste. This perfect attitude inferentially informs the aesthetic-attitude However, as Kant makes clear in the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, the practical faculties in general have to do with desire – i.e. Thus the latter (where the judgment has to proceed without a concept, sometimes in order to form a new concept) forms the greater philosophical problem here. This is of course related to the fact that Kant’s aesthetics has been hugely influential, while his teleology has sparked less contemporary interest; and also the fact that, in the Introduction to the whole text, Kant writes that ‘In a critique of judgment, [only] the part that deals with aesthetic judgment belongs to it essentially.’ (Introduction VIII). An object’s purpose is the concept according to which it was made (the concept of a vegetable soup in the mind of the cook, for example); an object is purposive if it appears to have such a purpose; if, in other words, it appears to have been made or designed. The initial issue is: what kind of judgment is it that results in our saying, for example, ‘That is a beautiful sunset’. In earlier work, Kant had pretty much assumed that judgment was simply a name for the combined operation of other, more fundamental, mental faculties. aesthetic awareness). At best, common sense was plausible as a possible explanation of, for example, the tendency to universality observed in aesthetic judgments. object that has a purposive form (that is, it is highly organised and On Kant’s analysis, aesthetic judgments are still more strange even than ordinary reflective judgments, and must have a number of peculiar features which at first sight look like nothing other than paradoxes. This problem is investigated by that mental faculty which Kant believes is the key to this unity, namely judgment. The summum bonum, God as moral author (and the immortality of the soul, treated in the Critique of Practical Reason) are all such objects of faith. However, it would be wrong to ignore the ‘Critique of Teleological Judgment’ either on the grounds of its lesser influence, or especially on the assumption that its content is intrinsically less interesting. Moreover, Judgment has, on the side of the subjective mind, made it conceivable to reason that its theoretical and practical employments are not only compatible (that was proved already in the Antinomy concerning freedom) but also capable of co-ordination towards moral purposes. This includes things in space outside of us, but also aspects of sensible human nature that are the objects of sciences such as psychology. This is because Kant is quite happy with the idea that God’s existence could never be necessary for theoretical reason. In Kant’s account of practical reason, the moral law is conceived of as duty.
object ought to be.
One Kant begins by giving a long clarification of art. Judgments Kant must overcome these paradoxes and explain how fine art can be produced at all.
The problem is solved by returning to the idealism we discussed in previous section of the introduction.
Hence, organic interconnectedness. United Kingdom, ‘The Peculiarity of the Human Understanding’, The Final Purpose and Kant’s Moral Argument for the Existence of God, The Problem of the Unity of Philosophy and its Supersensible Objects.
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